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Abstract The human consequences of drought are normally addressed in terms of Bwater
scarcity^ originating from human water use. In these terms, a common prediction to the next
few decades is that population growth, not climate change, will be the dominant factor
determining numbers living under such scarcity. Here we address the relative importance of
increasing human caused extreme drought and increasing population for numbers of humans
likely to be directly exposed in the future to such drought. Using the Standardized Precipitation
Evapotranspiration Index (SPEI) in conjunction with an ensemble of 16 CMIP5 climate
models we find that, by 2081-2100 under the high emissions scenario RCP 8.5, average
worldwide monthly population exposed to extreme drought (SPEI < -2) will increase by 386.8
million to 472.3 million (+426.6% from the current 89.7 million). Anthropogenic climate
change is responsible for approximately 230.0 million (59.5%) of that increase with population
growth responsible for only 35.5 million (9.2%); the climate change-population growth
interaction explains the remaining 121.1 million (31.4%). At the national level, 129 countries
will experience increase in drought exposure mainly due to climate change alone; 23 countries
primarily due to population growth; and 38 countries primarily due to the interaction between
climate change and population growth. Given inherently large uncertainties, projections of
future climate impacts should be accepted with caution especially those directed to the regional
level, to future population trends, and, of course, where technological, social and security
changes are possible.
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Among the many predicted geophysical consequences of climate change for human popula-
tions (IPCC 2013), we know that extreme droughts have the potential for particularly severe
damage to human economies, livelihoods and health—even beyond their impact on natural
resources and ecosystems (IPCC 2014; Kelley et al. 2015; Reyna 2010). Drought ranks
first among natural disasters in terms of the number of people affected (Mishra and Singh
2010), and between 1992 and 2001 it was by a substantial margin the primary cause of
death (277,574 deaths), followed by floods (96,507), earthquakes (77,756), and storms (60,447)
(Dilley 2005).
Drought frequency is predicted to increase in the next several decades (IPCC 2014) and
humans’ exposure to water scarcity is likely to be increased simply through population growth
(United Nations, 2013; Watts et al. 2015). But population growth and drought frequency might
have independent effects on numbers so exposed, and those effects might vary from place to
place. Absent drought, population growth is likely to put pressure on supplies of water, but
absent population growth, increased drought could well do the same. Here we address human
exposure to future droughts caused by the separate impacts of (a) population growth and (b)
increased incidence of droughts due to climate change, and by (c) the combined influence of
the two through their interaction.
Current hydrological literature often focuses on Bwater scarcity^ (the bottom line for human
populations rather than drought), in particular per capita water availability (Arnell 2004; Arnell
et al. 2011; Gosling and Arnell 2013; Kummu et al. 2010) or a withdrawals-to-availability ratio
(Gosling and Arnell 2013; Hanasaki et al. 2013; Vörösmarty et al. 2000). The impact of such
scarcity on particular populations is then evaluated in terms of the numbers of people falling
below a threshold value of water availability (e.g., 1000 m3/capita/year) or that exceed a
certain withdrawals-to-availability ratio (exceeding 0.4 is seen as water stress or severe water
limitation). The emerging finding from this literature (Arnell and Lloyd-Hughes 2014; Arnell
2004; Arnell et al. 2011; Gerten et al. 2011; Rockström et al. 2009; Vörösmarty et al. 2000)—
and, consequently, from the IPCC report (IPCC 2014)—is that Bpopulation change explains
the larger part of the overall change in water scarcity^ (Schewe et al. 2014). For policy-makers
the finding that future water scarcity Bwill be driven primarily by population growth and only
secondarily by climate change^ (Gerten et al. 2011) appears to undermine the importance of
nations’ emissions cuts relative to alternative policies (such as socioeconomic development)
that are widely recognized as resulting in slower population growth.
In the present paper we use a measure of drought based on the multiscalar Standardized
Precipitation Evapotranspiration Index (SPEI) (Vicente-Serrano et al. 2009) in conjunction
with the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 5, or CMIP5 (Taylor et al. 2011)
climate models to address populations’ future direct exposure to such drought. This measure’s
calculation uses the monthly difference between precipitation (P) and potential evapotranspi-
ration (PET) instead of monthly precipitation as in the standardized precipitation index (SPI)
(McKee et al. 1993). This difference between P and PET describes the water balance of the soil
(Thornthwaite 1948). Although other drought indices are based on water balance—notably the
Palmer drought severity index (PDSI) (Palmer 1965)—SPEI can represent different time
scales. At longer timescales (12 months or more), it has been shown to correlate with the
self-calibrating PDSI for a set of observatories with different climate characteristics located in
different parts of the world (Vicente-Serrano et al. 2009). In the present paper, we calculate the
accumulated difference between P and PET in the previous 24 months. To capture the
frequency and duration of drought, we define Bextreme drought^ as the environmental
condition for SPEI < −2, a common threshold value (Centre for Ecology and Hydrology 2016;
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Potop et al. 2013; Törnros and Menzel 2014). This condition may cause devastating social
impacts through crop and pasture losses, health and extreme fire risks (Svoboda et al. 2002).
We define populations’ exposure to extreme drought as the total number of people, in the
world or in a country, living in grid cells where SPEI < −2. In this respect, we do not model the
agricultural, economic, security and other social impacts of water shortages on human
populations. To our knowledge, however, modeling national populations’ exposure to future
extreme droughts based on SPEI has yet to be done in the context of CMIP5 climate models
and our paper attempts to fill that gap.
1 Modeling exposure to extreme droughts in the future
Predictions of droughts through the rest of the twenty-first century are derived from an
ensemble of 16 CMIP5 coupled climate models (Taylor et al. 2011)—each constructed at a
different modeling center—specified under the conventional four Representative Concentration
Pathways (Moss et al. 2010; Vuuren et al. 2011). See Supplementary Table 2 for a description of
the employed 16 models. Consistent with numerous other studies, we focus on the low
emissions RCP 4.5 and high emissions RCP 8.5 (results for RCP 2.6 and RCP 6.0 are available
in the replication dataset online). Notice that any uncertainty associated with these scenarios is
Binherited^ by our projections of drought exposure. The low emissions RCP 4.5, for instance,
may be unrealistic given the current emissions trajectory; however, the results based on this
scenario may still be useful as a benchmark against which to evaluate an alternative such as the
high emissions RCP 8.5.
Because we want to isolate climatic changes dependent on the respective RCPs, both the
4.5 and 8.5 projections used here are based on the same medium fertility population growth
scenario, an approach employed by previous studies (Hinkel et al. 2013). In general, under the
RCP 8.5/A2r population growth model, the population exposure values are higher than the
medium fertility scenario by about 10 % (see Supplementary Tables 9 and 10 for comparison
for the world total as well as for individual nations). For each of the 16 models, the constructed
data are interpolated to a 2° × 2° grid. Only the first available ensemble member of the
16 is adopted (Br1i1p1^ ensemble). For each model, we generate monthly SPEI data for
the period between January 2008 and December 2100. The calculation of future SPEI is
based on the reference surface precipitation and temperature simulated by the models
during 1955–2005. The future change is, therefore, relative to the present climate, which
implicitly accounts for climate models’ bias corrections, equivalent to the delta method
(Maraun et al. 2010; Teutschbein and Seibert 2012).
The global population raster landscape was constructed utilizing the LandScan 2008 High
Resolution Global Population Data Set (Bhaduri et al. 2007). We transformed the LandScan
grid to a format that matches the climate data 2° × 2° grid. The resulting population map has a
2184 x 4320 resolution matching the common climate data resolution of 91 x 180 by a factor
of 24. Since the land mask can lead to a loss of certain coastal areas (and, thus, populations), all
climate input files were used without the mask.
A national boundaries map was created on the basis of the Global Administrative Areas
dataset (Hijmans et al. 2011) which we matched initially with the LandScan 2008 map and
then aggregated to the common 2184 x 4320 grid format. The grid was verified and we found
zero population loss; all individuals from the higher-resolution LandScan map were accounted
for and assigned national identification values (see Supplementary Information for details).
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Notice that it is possible for the population of small nations to live within one or a small
number of grid cells. For such countries, the observed exposure is binary: either everyone is
exposed or no one is exposed to drought. While drought conditions typically affect larger
geographic areas, for such countries it is still more sensible to describe our results using the
probabilistic framework of the Bexpected^ number of people exposed to drought. In addition,
we describe our results by looking at 20-year periods (e.g., 2081–2100) which, in conjunction
with an ensemble of 16 climate models, generates 3840 data points (240 months * 16 models)
for each emissions scenario. Nevertheless, we emphasize that our projections for small nations
are associated with a larger degree of uncertainty than are projections for nations that
substantially exceed the size of a grid cell (2° × 2°).
The computational model is based on the United Nations medium fertility population
growth scenario (United Nations, 2013) (producing a world population of approximately
10.5 billion by the end of the century). In addition, we construct a population growth scenario
corresponding to the A2r projection matching the RCP 8.5 projections (approximately 12
billion world population by the end of the century). Similar to the uncertainty inherent in
climate models and emissions scenarios, the uncertainty associated with population growth
projections should be recognized in our results. While the UN projections are commonly used
in academic literature, growth trends may change due to unforeseen circumstances—such as
wars, mass migration, natural disasters, and so on.
Because we use a one month time period in the simulation, we transform the annual growth
rates to monthly growth rates using the following common formula,Gm = (1 +Gy)
1/12 − 1,
where Gm is the monthly growth rate and Gy is the annual growth rate. Each month, the
population of each cell of the world grid grows at a rate equal to the monthly growth rate of the
country to which it belongs (see Supplementary Information Figure 2 for an illustration). We
acknowledge that this is the simplest possible assumption for population growth but point out
that a number of other studies have used the same model, including a seminal paper (Arnell
2004). (See Supplementary Information for further technical details about our calculations of
national populations’ exposure to extreme drought.)
Finally, we note that we are using a meteorological drought index (SPEI) and simulate
population exposure to SPEI < −2 (Bextreme drought^) (Centre for Ecology and Hydrology
2016; Törnros and Menzel 2014). Although SPEI’s long time scales (e.g., 24 months) are
related to variations in groundwater storage (Vicente-Serrano et al. 2009), a comprehensive
assessment of drought impacts may, nevertheless, require hydrology-related drought indices
(Maskey and Trambauer 2015) and a study of groundwater resources (Green et al. 2011).
Moreover, there is additional uncertainty associated with technological and socioeconomic
changes, which will likely affect water usage, independent from the water surplus or deficit as
measured by the SPEI in the present study.
2 Results: global population exposure to extreme drought
First, our SPEI-based projections of future drought (Fig. 1) are qualitatively similar to those of
Orlowsky and Seneviratne (Orlowsky and Seneviratne 2013) who use the Standardized
Precipitation Index (SPI) to predict increased droughts in the Mediterranean, South Africa
and Central America/Mexico under RCP 8.5 for 2081–2100. The Mediterranean region is
similarly highlighted in another paper (Prudhomme et al. 2014) although their projections for
RCP 8.5 (for 2070–2099) are based on a hydrological drought model. Drought index maps for
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the separate climate models under RCP 4.5 and RCP 8.5 are shown in Supplementary
Information Figure 1. Both SPEI and the resulting population exposure projections (discussed
below) are characterized by substantial regional uncertainty—meaning that using a large
ensemble of climate models is necessary. For some regions, even a large ensemble of models
may not sufficiently reduce regional uncertainty. In East Africa, for example, increased
radiative forcing in CMIP5 models is associated with wetter conditions; however, the region
has been dry in recent decades (Otieno and Anyah 2013; Shongwe et al. 2011; Yang et al.
2014, 2015).
Second, and speaking to our present interest, we find (Table 1) that, worldwide, the number
of people exposed to extreme drought (SPEI < −2) will increase through the rest of this century
under both the RCP 4.5 and RCP 8.5 emissions scenarios—with the largest divergence
between those scenarios at the end of the century. More specifically, under RCP 4.5, the
average monthly worldwide population predicted to be exposed to drought will increase
between the periods 2008–2017 and 2018–2100 from the ensemble mean of 80.1 million to
211.7 million (+164.3 %) while under RCP 8.5, the equivalent increase will be from 89.7
million to 472.3 million (+426.5 %).
In general, all 16 climate models used here predict that, globally, there will be more people
exposed to extreme drought in the future than are so exposed at the present time. Furthermore,
all models predict higher exposure for RCP 8.5 than RCP 4.5. However—and consistent with
other studies (Schewe et al. 2014; Schmidhuber and Tubiello 2007)—we do find substantial
variance in predictions among the 16 climate models in our ensemble. For example, under
RCP 8.5, the global monthly population exposed to extreme drought during 2081–2100 is
110.2 million for the CNRM-CM5 model but 1145.5 million for IPSL-CM5A-MR (both far
from the ensemble median of 431.4 million). Our use of the whole ensemble helps to reduce
the uncertainties associated with such variation among individual models.
Our question concerns the relative role of population growth and anthropogenic climate
change in causing the sharp increase in the number of people exposed to drought toward the
end of the century (2081–2100). Addressing that, we conducted a simulation using four
Fig. 1 Average monthly SPEI values. Displayed data are based on the mean values from our ensemble of 16
climate models. Negative values of the SPEI index represent drought conditions
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conditions: (1) constant climate and constant population—the Bconstant world^ model; (2)
constant climate and growing population—the Bpopulation growth^ model; (3) changing
climate and constant population—the Bclimate change^ model; and (4) changing climate
and growing population—the Bcombined impacts^ model. The Bconstant world^ model is
based on population data (United Nations, 2013) fixed at 2008 and climate projections for the
2008–2017 period. The Bpopulation growth^ model keeps climate constant at the 2008–2017
projections while implementing the UN medium fertility population growth scenario (United
Nations, 2013). The Bclimate change^ model is based on population data fixed at 2008 but
varies climate according to the ensemble of 16 CMIP5 climate models and the four emissions
scenarios. Finally, the Bcombined impacts^ model implements both population growth and
changing climate. Figure 2 reports 2008–2100 projections for each of these conditions under
RCP 8.5.
From Table 2, keeping climate change constant, the medium population growth scenario
alone increases the average monthly number of people exposed to extreme drought from 85.5
to 121.0 million (+35.5 million). Keeping population constant, climate change alone increases
Table 1 Global monthly population exposed to extreme meteorological drought (in millions) for the ensemble of
climate models





















ACCESS1–0 88.6 115.6 135.9 174.6 263.0 43.0 151.9 167.8 301.5 614.0
BCC-CSM1.1 58.6 105.5 85.9 104.5 107.7 55.9 93.2 172.5 223.8 369.7
BNU-ESM 86.8 117.0 166.8 186.4 229.7 160.9 161.5 292.6 363.5 543.9
CCSM4 48.0 95.1 106.8 122.7 174.6 51.6 132.8 161.1 316.9 428.2
CESM1-CAM5 94.0 153.2 177.0 202.7 228.8 86.1 90.3 150.2 196.5 236.9
CMCC-CM 86.2 117.8 205.0 267.6 170.8 61.6 112.9 208.8 338.0 609.5
CNRM-CM5 81.3 104.9 60.9 48.5 67.2 134.3 76.8 75.6 93.9 110.2
CSIRO-Mk3–6-0 109.4 121.4 261.3 367.4 456.8 153.7 125.6 287.8 457.9 784.9
EC-EARTH 82.9 121.9 138.7 168.2 335.2 84.0 85.4 156.5 301.6 422.5
FGOALS-g2 66.3 34.1 106.2 154.0 100.9 53.4 59.4 108.3 256.5 390.0
GFDL-CM3 39.7 151.6 171.1 214.9 215.6 131.7 157.3 248.6 403.0 442.9
IPSL-CM5A-MR 131.4 190.2 228.6 379.7 358.2 84.2 180.2 374.1 754.3 1145.5
MIROC5 91.3 82.3 128.0 135.4 166.7 68.0 84.8 122.8 222.6 316.1
MPI-ESM-MR 66.2 73.2 129.4 166.6 185.5 95.2 92.9 195.3 311.2 434.5
MRI-CGCM3 83.1 95.6 129.3 121.2 135.7 79.8 103.8 126.7 162.0 196.9
NorESM1-M 68.4 168.9 207.5 143.9 191.5 91.5 119.6 197.7 412.6 511.1
Median 83.0 116.3 137.3 167.4 188.5 84.1 108.4 170.2 306.4 431.4
Mean 80.1 115.5 152.4 184.9 211.7 89.7 114.3 190.4 319.7 472.3
St. Dev. 22.5 38.1 54.0 88.7 102.0 36.9 34.7 77.7 150.6 245.9
Min 39.7 34.1 60.9 48.5 67.2 43.0 59.4 75.6 93.9 110.2
Max 131.4 190.2 261.3 379.7 456.8 160.9 180.2 374.1 754.3 1145.5
The numbers represent the mean value for each time period (the value for each 20 year period is based on the
mean for the corresponding 240 months). Both RCP 4.5 and RCP 8.5 are used in conjunction with the United
Nations medium fertility population growth model to isolate the role of climate change. Under the RCP 8.5/A2r
population growth model, the population exposure values are higher by about 10 % than in the table
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this number from 85.5 to 315.5 million (+230.0 million). Combining population growth and
climate change, population exposure reaches 472.3 million (+386.8 million relative to the
present). Dividing the impact of population growth by the combined impact of population
growth and climate change shows that the former is responsible for only 9.2 % of the increase
in numbers exposed to extreme drought while, in the same terms, climate change alone
accounts for 59.5 % of the increase. The interaction between climate change and population
growth explains the remaining 31.3 % of change in population exposure—reflecting the fact
that the growing population tends to be in regions with more frequent droughts.
The substantive results do not change under the higher (A2r) population growth scenario
(Fig. 2; Supplementary Table 11). In this case, population growth accounts for 11.1 % of the
increase in global monthly exposure to extreme drought; climate change is responsible for
52.6 %; and the population growth and climate change interaction explains the remaining
36.4 % of the total increase.
In the middle of the century (2041–2060), population growth plays a bigger role (29.6 %)
but one that is still secondary to that of climate change (48.1 %). The smallest difference
between the two sources of drought’s population impact is for 2041–2060 under RCP 4.5
(23.9 % and 29.4 % for population growth and climate change respectively). By the end of the
century, however, climate change plays the primary role even under RCP 4.5 (54.8 % of the
combined impact versus 29.4 % for population growth).
3 Results: national populations exposure to extreme drought
As might be expected, the relative impacts of population growth, climate change and the
interaction of the two are not the same for all countries. In fact, in Fig. 3 we identify seven
distinct types, or sets, of countries.
In Group 1 (which includes 19 countries—notably India, Vietnam and Bangladesh)
climate change will decrease numbers exposed to extreme drought by increasing precipitation
Fig. 2 Average monthly population exposed to extreme meteorological drought under RCP 8.5. The results are
based on the mean values from the ensemble of 16 CMIP5 climate models. The error bars represent 90 %
confidence intervals
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(see Fig. 1; Supplementary Table 3 provides descriptive statistics and details about the
important case of India in this respect). For these countries, the impact of population growth
is smaller relative to the impact of climate change and, thus, the net change in exposure is
negative.
Group 2 includes 7 countries (e.g., the Philippines, Malaysia, and Rwanda) in which
climate change alone similarly decreases numbers exposed to extreme drought but not
sufficiently to prevent a net increase in numbers so exposed as a result of high population
growth.
Group 3 consists of three outliers—Japan, Taiwan and Russia. While extreme drought
conditions are projected to increase for these three nations, substantial negative population
growth will result in a decrease of numbers exposed to such drought. China would have
belonged to this group had we used predictions from a median climate model as opposed to the
ensemble mean (see Supplementary Table 4 for details).
Group 4 is the second largest containing 54 nations. These are predicted to experience
negative population growth yet also a net increase in numbers exposed to extreme drought.
China belongs in this set, but notice that the total increase in numbers exposed to extreme
drought there (+598.4 thousand every month) is relatively small since the impact of negative
population growth (−3414.9) and the interaction of that with climate change (−895.2)















2041–2060: RCP 4.5 2041–2060: RCP 8.5
Constant
world
76.1 (66.2–86.4) 0.0 85.5 (69.6–102.9) 0.0
Population
growth
100.0 (86.3–114.3) 23.9 31.3 % 115.1 (93.1–140.1) 29.6 28.2 %
Climate
change
105.6 (87.9–123.9) 29.4 38.6 % 133.6 (106.7–164.0) 48.1 45.8 %
Combined
impacts
152.4 (127.4–178.3) 76.3 100.0 % 190.4 (155.7–229.1) 104.9 100.0 %
2081–2100: RCP 4.5 2081–2100: RCP 8.5
Constant
world
76.1 (66.2–86.4) 0.0 85.5 (69.6–102.9) 0.0
Population
growth
104.3 (88.1–122.0) 28.2 20.8 % 121.0 (96.5–149.5) 35.5 9.2 %
Climate
change
130.9 (103.9–160.6) 54.8 40.4 % 315.5 (244.5–401.1) 230.0 59.5 %
Combined
impacts
211.7 (166.1–262.5) 135.6 100.0 % 472.3 (364.4–596.8) 386.8 100.0 %
The results are based on the mean values from the ensemble of 16 CMIP5 climate models (the range in
parentheses represents 90 % confidence interval obtained by means of bootstrapping). Population growth is
responsible for (PG – CW) / (CI – CW) share of the total increase in global population exposure to extreme
drought, where PG is the exposure under population growth model only; CW is the constant world without
population growth and climate change; and CI is the model that includes both population growth and climate
change. Similarly, climate change is responsible for (CC – CW) / (CI – CW) share of the total increase, where CC
is the exposure under climate change and fixed population
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alleviated most of climate change’s impact (+4908.5). On the other hand, in Brazil and Spain
climate change dominates the increase in numbers exposed to extreme drought (Table 3).
Nations in Groups 5, 6, and 7 all experience both positive population growth and increased
drought conditions (climate change in isolation). The groups differ according to the factor that
is responsible for the largest share of the total increase in population exposure to drought—
specifically population growth (in Group 5), climate change (in Group 6), and their interaction
(in Group 7).
We observe that Group 5 is relatively small, composed of mostly African nations with very
high population growth and relatively modest increase in drought conditions. We conjecture
that, for these countries, socioeconomic development and the decreases in population growth
that it may bring could alleviate the impact of future droughts.
Group 6 is the largest one, including 75 countries—with the world as a whole matching the
criteria for this group. For these countries (as for the world as a whole), climate change alone
explains the largest share of the increase in drought exposure. For example, in the United
States, which belongs to this group, climate change is responsible for 61.3 % of the increase in
numbers exposed to extreme drought while population growth accounts for only 12.5 % of that
increase and the population growth-climate change interaction for the remaining 26.2 %.
Notice that, together with Group 4 (negative population growth, net positive increase in
exposure), these nations’ projections indicate that it is climate change rather than population
growth that is the reason for worse drought conditions. Finally, both climate change and
population growth play important roles for countries in Group 7, leading to an interaction
between (high) population growth and a substantial increase in extreme drought conditions as
the primary cause for the increased numbers of their citizens exposed to drought. For example,
in Nigeria the population growth-climate change interaction is responsible for 62.7 % of the
total impact; in Mali for 83.1 %; and in Senegal for 74.2 %.
Fig. 3 Classification of national populations by the relative impacts of population growth, climate change, and
the net population exposure to extreme drought under RCP 8.5 by the end of the century (2081–2100). The
results are based on the mean average monthly population exposure calculated from the ensemble of 16 climate
models. The calculations of relative impacts are based on the above four simulated conditions, viz. (1) constant
world, (2) constant climate, population growth, (3) climate change, constant population and (4) climate change
and population growth—as described above in detail
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4 Conclusion
Projections of exposure to future climate impacts are associated with multiple sources of
uncertainty inherent in climate models’ predictions, emissions scenarios, groundwater re-
sources, population growth trends, and generally unpredictable technological, social and
security changes. Acknowledging this uncertainty, we simulate population exposure to ex-
treme drought throughout the twenty-first century under different emissions scenarios.
Consistent with the most recent Assessment Report by the IPCC (IPCC 2014), we focus on
2041–2060 and 2081–2100 periods examining the relative contributions of climate change and
population growth to increases in drought exposure globally and also for individual nations.
An emerging consensus in the current literature on water scarcity (Arnell and Lloyd-
Hughes 2014; Arnell 2004; Arnell et al. 2011; Gerten et al. 2011; Rockström et al. 2009;
Vörösmarty et al. 2000), as well as the IPCC report (IPCC 2014), implies that future water
scarcity will by primarily caused by population growth and only secondarily by climate change
(Gerten et al. 2011; Schewe et al. 2014). For policy-makers, these conclusions may imply, in
Table 3 National populations’ exposure to extreme meteorological drought during 2081–2100 under RCP 8.5























Nigeria 22,966.6 (6030.3–44,459.5) 21,831.2 5050.5 3099.6 13,681.2
Turkey 22,258.1 (13,687.6–31,602.4) 21,182.0 184.7 17,547.9 3449.4
China 19,605.3 (5450.8–45,040.2) 598.4 −3414.9 4908.5 −895.2
Algeria 19,198.3 (14,057.3–24,418.0) 18,185.9 517.6 11,672.0 5996.3
Mexico 19,152.1 (10,471.7–29,732.5) 17,483.5 319.7 14,422.1 2741.6
Morocco 17,258.0 (12,991.3–21,872.6) 16,651.2 216.3 12,197.9 4237.0
Egypt 15,929.8 (8754.6–25,213.1) 15,281.9 520.7 8186.2 6575.0
Brazil 15,710.6 (9555.2–22,544.9) 13,063.1 −163.4 14,150.5 −924.0
Venezuela 14,989.7 (8024.4–22,478.3) 13,838.9 562.3 8963.7 4312.9
USA 14,945.4 (7399.7–23,910.7) 11,465.3 1432.9 7028.3 3004.0
Indonesia 11,542.4 (2291.1–24,586.5) 6117.0 1888.6 3160.5 1067.9
Spain 10,831.2 (7453.7–14,602.2) 9736.6 −147.8 11,530.5 −1646.1
Mali 10,474.2 (4776.1–17,229.4) 10,451.6 99.3 1669.7 8682.6
Senegal 10,456.2 (5512.1–15,953.7) 10,361.4 299.5 2377.2 7684.7
Syria 9901.7 (6628.0–13,484.3) 9553.6 290.4 5003.5 4259.7
India 9731.4 (3144.8–18,585.0) −2489.4 4072.3 −4928.8 −1632.8
Italy 9520.1 (6500.1–13,133.1) 8737.5 −101.6 10,162.5 −1323.4
Guatemala 8584.4 (3392.1–14,854.3) 8431.8 344.9 2504.5 5582.3
France 8456.9 (5204.7–11,907.6) 8145.8 57.7 6802.3 1285.8
Iraq 8456.0 (4138.9–13,848.7) 7767.7 1653.9 1783.0 4330.7
The results are based on the mean values from the ensemble of 16 CMIP5 climate models. Top 20 nations with
the largest average monthly population exposed to extreme meteorological drought (combined impacts of
population growth and climate change). 95 % confidence intervals are obtained by means of bootstrapping
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turn, that focusing on economic development and, consequently, slower population growth,
should be the political priority.
Here we look at the population exposure to extreme drought using a meteorological drought
index, SPEI-24, which at a 24-month time scale is also related to variations in groundwater
storage (Vicente-Serrano et al. 2009), finding that climate change plays the main role in
predicting future exposure to extreme droughts (the number of people living in grid cells with
SPEI < −2). Under RCP 8.5 and during the period 2081–2100, in global terms climate change
alone is responsible for 59.5 % of drought exposure, with the climate change and population
growth interaction accounting for 31.4 %. Population growth alone causes a relatively minor
9.2 % increase. Similarly, climate change is the main source of increasing drought exposure in
129 countries—by comparison with only 23 countries where the drought exposure will rise
due to population growth.
We caution that our numerical projections should not be taken literally given the very large
uncertainties mentioned above. Nevertheless, the emerging picture and its political implica-
tions are both clear: Climate change mitigation should be the main policy response in efforts to
alleviate numbers exposed to future extreme droughts. For the world as a whole—as well as
for a substantial majority of its national populations—plausible future decreases in population
growth will not make a major dent in the very large increase of numbers likely to be exposed to
extreme drought through the rest of this century. Overwhelmingly, future increases in humans’
exposure to extreme drought will be a consequence of anthropogenic climate change.
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